The following excerpt is the revised section 2.10.1 of my On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo.
Even though Heidegger’s great achievement remains his uncovering of the meaning of being as originary, three-dimensional time during the course of his wide-ranging work in the 1920s, culminating in Sein und Zeit, after the failure of this work, before 1930, there is a turn, or rather pivot, in his thinking toward bringing disclosive, or deconcealing, truth (ἀλήθεια) into the foreground at the cost of tacitly relegating the three-dimensional temporal openness to a lesser, or even superseded status. This is apparent already in his WS 1928/29 Freiburg lectures(fn25), and is made explicit when Heidegger writes repeatedly over the years, ”The name ‘time’ in the title mentioned [Being and Time], according to the clearly expressed belonging to being, is the provisional name for the more originary essencing of ἀλήθεια.” (Der Name ‘Zeit’ ist in dem gemeinten Titel [Sein und Zeit] gemäß der klar ausgesprochenen Zugehörigkeit zum Sein der Vorname für das ursprünglichere Wesen der ἀλήθεια. GA54:113(fn26)) The clearing (Lichtung) is already assigned in Sein und Zeit to the question of truth, without exploring its implications, or interweavings, with originary time as openness for the world. This leads Heidegger, in part, to even equate concealment with absence, e.g. in his WS 1933/1934 lectures: ”…out of the absence and concealment hitherto [prevailing] into the repre-sentedness [to the mind]…” (…aus der bisherigen Abwesenheit und Verborgenheit in die Vor-gestelltheit… GA36/37:117) and ”Being signifies for the Greeks to be present, not absent, not hidden…” (Sein bedeutet für die Griechen anwesend sein, nicht abwesend, nicht verborgen… GA36/37:229).
Nowhere does Heidegger painstakingly and unmistakably clarify the distinction and criss-crossed interplay between concealment, deconcealment, absence, presence, which is not surprising, given that ἀλήθεια is deployed as the substitute concept for ‘time’. Nor does he clarify the fourth temporal dimension first introduced — or rather, popping up briefly in a ‘guest appearance’ — in his late 1962 talk ‘Zeit und Sein’ as the temporal dimension through which essents essence for the understanding mind from all three remaining temporal dimensions, namely, past, present and future. The talk itself is rather an anomaly, for it marks a brief return to the question of originary time after decades of neglect. Rather, on the contrary, he thoroughly confuses and conflates concealment, absence, deconcealment and presence, thereby displaying conceptual carelessness or confusion for the sake of foregrounding ἀλήθεια. Such carelessness is discernible, of course, only for conceptual thinking, and not for scholarly diligence’s comparing of quotes.
The roots of this confusion or rather, this failure to make headway, are apparent already in GA24, the volume with the SS 1927 Marburg lectures delivered in the year when Sein und Zeit (SuZ) was published. It contains, notably, the only published attempt by Heidegger to present the third and final part of SuZ. Here the reader can witness Heidegger floundering in trying to make a distinction between existential Zeitlichkeit and the more outlying Temporalität, starting from the phenomenon of Dasein’s existential understanding of the at-handness of Zeug (equipment) by introducing a distinction between the transcendental horizons of Gegenwart and Praesenz, i.e. the difference between phenomena designated by the Germanic and Latin words for English ‘presence’. He makes no headway, and it is no wonder that he abandons the attempt to complete Sein und Zeit, thus making room for his thinking to subsequently pivot to the question of ἀλήθεια, in particular, in the 1930 talk ‘Vom Wesen der Wahrheit’ as well as in the GA27 WS 1928/29, GA34 WS 1931/32 and GA36/37 WS 1933/34 lectures, all of which engage with the question of Vom Wesen der Wahrheit (on the essencing of truth).
At times he does underscore and show phenomenologically (e.g. by adducing the factual case of a stolen bicycle) that (local) absence itself is compatible with a presencing in the mind as the locally absent bicycle, and thus a mode of being (i.e. of essencing) in its own right, and even that this mental presencing from local absence is deconcealing. E.g. when you lose your car keys and discover the loss, the physically, locally absent car keys are very present to your mind, and also deconcealed correctly (to your mind) despite — or rather, precisely in — their local absence from your pocket (they are missing, somewhere else), even though you do not know (concealed to your presencing mind) where they are at present (their precise location is concealed). In this example, absence from place in the present (you can sensuously feel in your pocket that they are not there) and focused presence to mind go together. Local absence as mental presence! It is, however, crucial in each case to clearly distinguish between non-being (ontologically), absence (temporalogically) and concealment in the mind, in the physical world (locally) and in the social world, i.e. to have them firmly distinct in mental view.
In short, Heidegger surrenders and buries his discovery of the temporal meaning of being by shifting his focus to and foregrounding the phenomenon of ἀλήθεια, i.e. truth as deconcealment. This shiftiness in position begins already in Sein und Zeit (1927) with the long section on Wahrheit (truth § 44), the final section before the start of the second part of SuZ on “Dasein und Zeitlichkeit” (lit. ‘timeliness’) that amounts to a deeper grounding, through conceptual repetition, of the Sorge (care) structure (which is the culmination of SuZ’s first part) in ecstatic time. This positioning already indicates equivocation and tendentially cuts off the phenomen of truth from its temporal roots.
Years later, in What Calls to Thinking? (Was heißt Denken? 1951/52), he even incoherently gives precedence to deconcealing over presencing when he writes, “What is presencing has emerged from deconcealment.”(fn27), rather than absence, as if all presencing were a deconcealing and as if pure presencing required a deeper-lying, more originary deconcealedness already beforehand to enable the presencing of something. Already Aristotle distinguishes various meanings of being (or, more precisely, of the beingness of beings) including that of οὐσία (essence, quidditas, whatness) as well as ἀλήθεια conceived as the truth/falsity of propositions (λόγοι) about (κατά) beings. Heidegger shows that the truth of a being does not reside originarily in a proposition about it, but in the being itself, e.g. true gold is a mode of being/presencing of gold in its deconcealed truth, rather than a false deconcealing as false gold. False gold, however, presents itself, i.e. presences, albeit distortedly, deceptively as if it were true gold. Its falsity depends upon its sensuous presencing as…. Truth is thus a characteristic of essents themselves presencing for the mind as such-and-such rather than a quality of propositions which, as it turns out, can at most be correct, but not true in the sense of a deconcealment of their phenomenal mode of essencing. A correct proposition only corresponds, or is adequate to (adequatio) the deconcealment of the factual (temporal) phenomenon in question itself. The truth of phenomena delves deeper (than their facticity) into their historical hermeneutic casting by a hermeneutic As, i.e. it concerns how the world in a given age is interpreted.
Throughout his entire career as a thinker Heidegger does not square his uncovering of the temporal nature of being itself with his investigation of ἀλήθεια as disclosure (Unverborgenheit, deconcealment, revealment). Further evidence of his confusion and equivocation are his lectures and writings on Nietzsche, where we read repeatedly the formulation of the implicit meaning of being (or rather beingness, οὐσία, essencing, presencing) for the Greeks, ”presencing of the steadfast into the deconcealed” (Anwesenheit des Beständigen in das Unverborgene NII:217, the ‘into’ rather than ‘in’ is required to translate the accusative case of ‘in das’). The steadfast here are the ideas themselves, the persistently present ontological ‘looks’ of beings as beings in which they stand for the mind’s understanding when coming to mental presence, thus deconcealing themselves as such-and-such to the mind. The steadfast looks of beings are what make up the ontological cast or scaffolding of an age that is deconcealed to the mind of that age, i.e. its Zeit-Geist. Reformulated temporalogically: the hermeneutic cast of an age consists of the scaffolding of interconnected, steadfast εἴδη or eidetic ‘looks’ of the essents essencing in three-dimensional time for the mind that enable the essents to be understood as such-and-such. As ‘always already’ cast in a given age, they essence, via the fourth temporal dimension, for the mind from the past (to be discussed in more detail below; cf. 6 Temporalogical recasting in historical time).
Further reading: On Human Temporality: Recasting Whoness Da Capo (OHT) De Gruyter, Berlin 2024.
(fn25) Martin Heidegger Einleitung in die Philosophie (GA27) Otto Saame & Ina Saame-Speidel (eds.), Klostermann, Frankfurt 1996.
(fn26) GA54 contains the WS 1942/43 lectures on Parmenides centred on the interpretation of ἀλήθεια. The purported “clearly expressed belonging [of time] to being” is back to front, for it is, in truth, being in the sense of presence (Anwesenheit) that belongs to time. Cf. also e.g. Zur Sache des Denkens, “The name ‘time’ is the provisional name for what was later called ‘the truth of being’.” (Der Name ‘Zeit’ ist der Vorname für das, was später ‘die Wahrheit des Seins’ hieß. SD:30).
(fn27) “Das Anwesende ist aus der Unverborgenheit aufgegangen.” GA08:240.
